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RESPONSE TO JOSEPH ALLEGRETTI: THE
RELEVANCE OF RELIGION TO A
LAWYER'S WORK
Lawrence A. Hoffman
INTRODUCTION
P ROFESSOR Allegretti's paper divides into three parts: (1) Back-
ground: his survey of religion's shrinking impact on the profes-
sions, along with his call for the reassertion of the kind of holism that
a religious perspective provides; (2) Problem: his claim that current
legal practice is governed by a minimalist model of contract; and (3)
Solution: his proposal of an alternative paradigm, covenant. He
writes all three sections as a Christian, and I have been invited to re-
spond from my own faith perspective: Judaism.
In my own division of the topic, in part I, I differentiate substantive
from consensual value statements, the former being specific religious
positions on ethical issues, and the latter being general metaphoric
models for thinking about those issues. I argue that law, like other
professions, is an institutionalized public good, properly secularized in
a pluralistic society, unlikely to be swayed by conflicting substantive
claims of the various religions, but especially in need of consen-
sual values, such as what Allegretti offers.
Next, I address Allegretti's parts (H) and (III) together, suggesting
that his dismissal of the contract paradigm may be too sweeping.
Though Judaism would accept a covenant model, it would view cove-
nant as more akin to contract than opposed to it, and would see in
contract many of the values that Allegretti sees in covenant. Judaism
attaches a specifically legal model to society at its best, locating God's
love in the provision of the institution of law. Contracts are central,
therefore, and are appropriately rooted in a transcendent consensual
value. It is such a value that is lacking.
In part II, I offer as a transcendent consensual value the Talmudic
mandate never to allow society to imagine that "There is no justice
and no judge" (leit din v'leit dayyan).1 The Rabbis identify the sin
which brought about the flood in the time of Noah as being just this
antinomian notion. Lawyers should see themselves as upholding soci-
ety by underscoring the existence of justice, and can address ethical
dilemmas by a calculus measuring justice gained against justice
denied.
1. The Fordham Law Review relies on the author's expertise in Hebrew transla-
tions throughout this article.
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I. BACKGROUND: LAW AS AN INSTITUTIONALIZED PUBLIC GOOD:
CONSENSUAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE VALUE CLAIMS
Allegretti's introductory use of bioethics as a point of comparison is
particularly instructive, because it helps us focus on the sort of reli-
gious intervention that would be appropriate in the professions, gen-
erally, and, therefore, in law particularly. Recollecting Callahan's first
stage of religious engagement in bioethics (the 1960s), he recalls that
"the only [bioethical] resources were theological or those drawn from
within the tradition of medicine, themselves heavily shaped by reli-
gion."2 Callahan bemoans the usurpation of religion's place by secu-
lar theory (in the 1970s) and hopes to see religion return as a partner
with medicine in "the great debates about the meaning of life and
death."3
The problem with such a sweeping aspiration is that one wonders
just what such a partnership would look like. For one thing, it is not
altogether clear to me that medicine was more humanely, more relig-
iously, or more ethically practiced in Stage One. For another, it is not
self-evident that American pluralism will (or should) encourage reli-
gious intervention of certain kinds. The problem is that however posi-
tively we may think of religion in general, everyone can readily think
of instances where "someone else's religious opinion" is exactly what
we consider bad advice for American public policy. Increasingly,
moreover, the "someone else" may even be speaking in the name of
our own religion! That is because the greatest change on the religious
landscape since the 1960s has been the polarization of religious bodies
into conservative and liberal wings. Whereas once upon a time it
could be said that there was a distinctive ethos that was, say, Lutheran
or Jewish or Roman Catholic, it is now unclear that any single position
on any single issue reflects the totality of any given religion or confes-
sion.4 Some churches, like Roman Catholicism, are centrally organ-
ized enough that they seem to speak with a single official voice, but
even there, "on the ground" (as it were), where real people live their
lives, the church is fractured into right and left wings.
Speaking from my own situation, for instance, I ask what guidance
Judaism would have for such weighty biomedical issues as abortion,
organ transplants, and the like, and the truth is, it depends on who you
ask: the Social Action Commission of my own liberal Reform Move-
ment or the Chasidic community of Williamsburg, Monsey, and
Crown Heights. Pluralistic societies like America have secularized
2. Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on
Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1101, 1102 (1998) (quoting Daniel
Callahan, Religion and the Secularization of Bioethics, 20 Hastings Center Report
Special Supp. 2 (July/Aug. 1990)).
3. Id. at 1103.
4. See Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and
Faith Since World War II (1988).
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their professions precisely to avoid the kind of religious involvement
that would prove chaotic, contentious, and unresolvable in the end. If
we are to empower religion, we will have to be clear about where its
proper role resides.
That role emerges from our understanding of at least some of the
professions as institutionalized public goods. The key word here is
"public," in the economic sense of a good that is owned by all mem-
bers of society. Thus, we have the American assumption that every-
one is entitled to an education, medical care, and the law. It is the
very nature of modem society, where religion is separate from the
state, and where, therefore, no single religious wisdom can be ex-
pected to prevail, that institutionalized public goods are secular. Reli-
gion might conceivably say two sorts of things to such institutions. I
will label them substantive and consensual.5
Substantive statements are specific religious positions on equally
specific ethical problems. For example: "It is right/wrong to allow
abortions" (medicine); "to hand out condoms to 8th graders" (educa-
tion); or "to limit legal fees in class action suits" (law). Religions have
a right to offer substantive guidance, but they should understand that
the more specific they get, the more likely it will be that they repre-
sent only a fraction of the entire religious opinion in the country.
Moreover, it is likely they will represent not even the totality of what
their own church membership (or even its clergy) believe, given the
polarization process I mentioned earlier. They can expect, therefore,
that to the public (and secular) institution in question, their combined
voices will sound less like 3000 years of religious sagacity, and more
like the Tower of Babel. Substantive pronouncements are still in or-
der in the pluralistic marketplace of ideas where they may sway indi-
viduals; however, they are apt to get nowhere in terms of influencing
public policy because there will be no religious consensus for the pub-
lic institution to hear and to adopt.
Consensual value statements, on the other hand, are pronounce-
ments so general that they may be shared across religious lines, even
by people who do not share substantive solutions. Religions tend to
trade heavily in such formulas of general value, often to the point of
sounding soppy and truistic, by repeating the saccharine certainties
that no one ever doubted anyway. Consensual values, however, need
not be so self-evident. Often they are religious models for thinking
differently about a problem, though they are not a specific position on
the problem itself. It is helpful to see religion as an institutionalized set
5. Cf Lawrence A. Hoffman, Liturgical Basis for Social Policy: A Jewish Vie, in
Liturgical Foundations of Social Policy in the Catholic and Jewish Traditions 151, 151-
68 (Daniel F. Polish & Eugene J. Fisher eds., 1983) (dividing statements into consen-
sual and substantive, and observing, in the first instance, that consensual statements
are non-controversial and poor sources of policy, while substantive statements are
products of debate resulting in policy choices).
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of alternative metaphorical models for life's most puzzling issues. Reli-
gion's proper function is to help secular institutions rethink their basic
paradigms.
Now Allegretti's contribution to our topic becomes clear. He has
questioned the prevailing metaphorical model of practicing law by is-
suing an alternative consensual value statement. Law is covenant, he
says, not contract. In a pluralistic milieu, one useful characteristic of
consensual value statements is that they are not all or nothing, not
zero-sum games. By contrast, substantive value statements cannot co-
exist together. It is either right or wrong to assist a suicide by an
Alzheimer patient, right or wrong to advertise legal advice at cut-
throat prices. These are substantive issues and even though there may
be two sides to them (indeed, real moral dilemmas always have many
aspects to weigh), in the end, you have to take a stand and act accord-
ing to one side or the other. But consensual statements do their work
more subtly; they shape theory, which is to say, they give us a struc-
ture to imagine who we think we are and what we think we are doing.
Several consensual statements can co-exist together, as, for instance,
in our case, where we are invited to think about how law might be
contract-based, covenant-based, or both.
II. THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION: LAW AS CoNTRAcr OR AS
COVENANT
Allegretti faults the contract paradigm for being minimal and for
aiding and abetting domination of one partner by the other. It fosters,
he says, the mutual suspicion typical of "wary strangers" in which par-
ties deal with each other as utilitarian objects, offering money (for the
lawyer) or services (for the client).6 He prefers a holistic wedding of
person to person, all encompassing, caring, lasting, and unlimited by
the specific issue that brings the two together. The covenant model
engenders trusting openness by each party, the promise of mutual
growth, a kind of "friendship" in fact, and the option to explore mat-
ters beyond their legal parameters, such as challenging a father whose
petulance has led him to the attorney to draw up a will disinheriting
his son.7 This activity is based in need, not contractual commitment. a
It is answerable for consequences beyond the last day in court.9 It
establishes lawyer and client as members of a moral community, puz-
zling together on the right thing to do.10
Clearly, there is a lot here that I find satisfying. Moreover, Al-
legretti argues not just from his Christian perspective. He cites Chris-
tian scripture as well as Hebrew Scripture, and I suspect we might find
6. Allegretti, supra note 2, at 1116.
7. Id. at 1125.
8. Id. at 1123.
9. Id. at 1123-24.
10. Id. at 1121.
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supportive evidence in other sacred writings, such as the Koran, as
well. 1 Allegretti depends largely on Martin Buber. At the moment
of meeting, lawyer and client are very much in what Buber called an
"I-Thou" moment governed by the mutuality of the covenant, not the
legal niceties of the contract. They inhabit the unique and rewarding
social relationship that anthropologist Victor Turner called "com-
munitas," a place where strict rules do not control the relationship,
and where instead, the relationship and the mutual needs of the peo-
ple who comprise it determine the rules. This, he says, is where all
true growth occurs. It is the stuff of which human satisfaction is made.
Jewish sources do indeed have positive things to say about cove-
nants. I think, however, that Jewish wisdom would be less likely to
contrast covenant and contract and would, in fact, be more sympa-
thetic to seeing contracts as equally moral and even spiritual under-
takings. I believe Allegretti and I are not poles apart here; he too
returns at the end to say, "The choice, then, is not between contract or
covenant. Covenant builds upon and enlarges contract. 1 2 We proba-
bly, however, do have somewhat different perspectives that are worth
investigating. Let me explore some problems I have with covenant, as
Allegretti describes it, trying instead to rescue contract as a valid reli-
gious option. Then I will return to my Jewish tradition for yet a third
model, that I think is in keeping with my alternative notion of contract
as potentially a kind of covenant in itself.
I find Allegretti's dichotomy too absolute. Judaism would not dis-
miss contract as minimalist. The Jewish social canvas is painted pre-
cisely with many overlapping contracts. God's covenant is itself
esteemed as a contract, so that Judaism values contracts as the very
essence of human existence. Even parenting is a contract. Take the
case of recovered memory: a woman in therapy recalls being an incest
victim and asks now how she can go on honoring her mother and fa-
ther, as the Ten Commandments demand. 3 A Jewish answer, argua-
bly, would be that strictly speaking she is commanded only to honor
them, not necessarily to love them. Love cannot be commanded ex-
cept toward God ("You shall love the Lord your God"), 4 who is held
by definition to be so all-just and all-beneficent as to automatically
attract such love anyway; and neighbor ("Love your neighbor as your-
self"), 5 which is not so much about love as it is about self-aggrandize-
ment at a neighbor's expense. True, if all parents lived up to the
standard of God, we would automatically love parents too, but to the
11. Id. at 1118.
12. Id. at 1128.
13. Exodus 20:12; Deuteronomy 5:16 (New Revised Standard 1989). All Biblical
citations and quotations are from the New Revised Standard Bible unless otherwise
denoted.
14. Deuteronomy 6:5.
15. Leviticus 19:18.
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extent that parents fall short of that ideal, it is natural that our love
will ebb also; and in this case, it is natural for the victim to feel anger,
not love. She is commanded, nonetheless, to honor her father, that
being a contractual matter. Honor is now defined in terms of specific
duties: she must care for him in his old age, clothe him if she has the
means and he does not, feed him lest he starve, and so forth. In a
parallel case, society, generally, has to "honor" even criminals: that is,
they are human beings made in God's image, and though I may not
love them, I do "honor" them, by providing for their basic needs, even
in prison.
I raise this particular issue because it highlights a frequently cited
difference of perspective between Judaism and Christianity. I do not
want to make too much of it, but there is, I think, still some sense in
which Christian ethics has split off love from law in a way that Jews
have not. It was common once upon a time to accuse Jews of being
legalistic-like Shakespeare's Shylock, where a contract is a contract
come what may.16 The Jewish covenant was said to be pure law, as
opposed to the Christian covenant in Christ which was a covenant of
love. Only in religiously antediluvian circles do people still preach
that, to be sure; both Judaism and Christianity have a healthy appreci-
ation for both love and law. But, it is true that Jewish literature re-
mains, above all, legal literature. Thus, when the Rabbis speak about
the covenant, they do so with the rhetoric of contract, embracing the
contractual aspect of law as an exemplification of the highest form of
love. The giving of the law is God's most loving act, celebrated with a
daily blessing, "Blessed art Thou who loves your people Israel."
As I have explained, Allegretti does not utterly dismiss contract,
however, and I do not utterly dismiss covenant. He is absolutely right
to hold out the biblical model of faithfulness through time, abiding
friendship, concern beyond the details of the contractual obligation,
and so on. Hosea reminds Israel that God will not give up on her.
Knowing that this covenant can sustain contractual default from time
to time, Isaiah announces comfort to the exiles. Moreover, Rabbi
Levi of Berditchev insists he will continue worshiping God, even when
it is God who falls down on the deal by letting Jews suffer though they
have done nothing to warrant it. I certainly agree with Allegretti's
thoughtful admonition that we avoid the minimalist extremes to which
contract alone is liable. My point is that contract as a kind of cove-
nant need not be minimal; and, likewise, that covenant split off from
contract has its own problems.
16. William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice act 4, sc. 1 (W.G. Clark & W.
Aldis Wright eds., n.d.): "Portia: The quality of mercy is not strain'd .... Therefore,
Jew, Though justice be thy plea, consider this, That, in the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy .... Shylock: ... I crave the law, The
penalty and forfeit of my bond." Id. at 376.
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Allegretti knows them, but they deserve discussion to prevent load-
ing the demands of covenant with more weight than it will bear. In
the American system of law, even scoundrels deserve legal represen-
tation. But does the lawyer have the obligation to establish a cove-
nant through time with every scoundrel? Is it not enough, at times, to
do what is right without establishing enduring commitment beyond
what is ethically owed the client? For that matter, does a client have
to be open to friendly advice from every lawyer? What if I have such
a relationship with my own lawyer, but find myself dealing with a spe-
cialist called in by him for consultation? She is there purely con-
tracted for her expertise in a fine point of law. She hardly knows me.
Need I be open to her questions about whether I really want to disin-
herit my son? Especially if I have just been through that question with
the first lawyer, with whom I may indeed have a covenant such as
Allegretti describes? In my own profession, I teach in a university
classroom, and establish contracts with all my students. With luck,
some of them become relationships that are indeed covenantal in Al-
legretti's sense; but, some of them are not. Also, from the students'
perspective, some may see me as the problem, not the solution, but
they and I are thrown together in a classroom, and we have a contract
that we honor. On such things society is based.
In other words, contract and covenant are not oppositional. Even
marriage, clearly a covenant, is at least implicitly contractual, though
hardly minimalist. After thirty years of marriage, husband and wife
hardly need to write down What is owed on a day to day basis, but
they know if they have broken faith. When Martin Buber posited his
notion of I-Thou relationship, including within it the Jewish covenant
with God, he was taken to task by Franz Rosenzweig for imagining
that any covenant could exist without contractual items at its center. I
value contract more than I think Allegretti does.
Im. A JEWISH CONSENSUAL VALUE: "THINK NOT, 'THERE IS NO
JUSTICE AND NO JUDGE"'
All of this leads me to a consensual value that might arise more
readily from Jewish sources. It is, as you will expect, more closely
allied to contract, more firmly entrenched in a view of law as para-
mount for human existence. It is best represented by the oft-cited
dictum leit din v'leit dayyan: "[Let no one ever imagine] there is no
justice and no judge [of the universe.]"
Adlegretti is absolutely correct when he urges us to think in broad
terms of the good we do in society. His view of law sees it as more
than a secular profession which we enter for reasons that even we may
forget or fail to fathom, as if it is only for our own interests, and we
have no broader responsibility beyond what the most meager code of
professional ethics has to say. Professions generally are in need of his
1998] 1163
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cautionary note,'7 and not just from the perspective of what they owe
others. Considering that Americans of the 1990s have spent two de-
cades being conditioned to denounce professionals, almost as much as
their parents in the 1950s were conditioned to worship them, is it any
wonder that professionals themselves need some transcendent value
to uphold their own self-esteem?' 8 The question is what overriding
image, or consensual metaphor (as I have called it) we wish to posit.
Seeing contract at the opposite pole from covenant, Allegretti posits
covenant. I like covenant also, at times. I like contract also, for other
times. I see covenant as a contract through time, but a contract none-
theless. The issue is not whether law is one or the other, but how it
can in different circumstances be either one or a little of both, and
whether we can find a third consensual conceptualization that does
justice to both ends of the spectrum.
When I was a rabbinic student, my Talmud professor, Samuel Atlas,
may he rest in peace, held class for just three of us in his crowded
dusty office, equipped with exactly four chairs, a desk, several weighty
tomes of Talmud, and a telephone. One day he informed us that he
was engaged in a long-term suit over something relatively petty, a case
hardly worth his or his lawyer's time. He made it a point, however, to
bother his lawyer about it on occasion, just to keep the case going. I
suspect you all know the type: first degree nuisances whose case you
took and wish you had not.
"But Dr. Atlas," I asked him, "if you yourself know it is not worth
your time, and if your lawyer concurs, why do you not quit?" "Be-
cause," he said, "I am right, and I have a religious obligation to do
nothing that would cast doubt on the ultimate justice of the universe."
With that, he made his obligatory call to the lawyer, whose secretary
was no doubt armed with instructions never to let the old man's call
go through. She would take a message, however. "Tell him," said my
teacher, "that Professor Atlas wants to know if there is justice in the
world."
I do not know what the poor overworked lawyer made of that
message, but I know what Dr. Atlas was thinking. He opened a vol-
ume from memory, handed it across the desk to us, and commanded,
"Read!" And this is what I read:
The evil generation of Noah's flood said, "God will not judge me."
Rabbi Akiba cited Scripture: "[T]he wicked say in their hearts, You
17. See, e.g., Laura S. Brown, The Private Practice of Subversion: Psychology as
Tikkun Olam, 52 Am. Psychologist 449 (1997) (addressing "the harmful effects of...
the timeworn notion that psychologists can be objective observers").
18. Negative discussion of professions began already in the 1970s. See, e.g., Magali
Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (1977) (explor-
ing the link between the professional market and social class and structure). On the
limits of professional ethics, see Paul F. Camenisch, Clergy Ethics and the Profes-
sional Ethics Model, in Clergy Ethics in a Changing Society: Mapping the Terrain
114-33 (James P. Wind et al. eds., 1991).
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[God] will not call us to account" (Ps. 10:13) meaning, "There is no
judge and there is no justice." In truth, there is a judge and there is
justice.19
I can think of nothing that will help lawyers more than to keep for-
ever before them the Jewish horror that society might sink once again
to the level of the generation of the flood because it concludes leit din
v'leit dayyan, "There is neither judge nor justice." Lawyers should see
themselves as keepers of society's faith that "[in truth, there is a
judge and there is justice." As contracts mature into covenants, or
even at the moment of deciding if they should, the overriding moral
imperative is that the lawyer never act in such a way as to let someone
think otherwise.
As Allegretti says, lawyers do, therefore, raise questions about dis-
inheriting a son, but the reason is not that they stand in covenant
rather than mere contract, but that in the grand scheme of things,
overzealousness may be unjust. They represent scoundrels because
not to do so would add to the injustice of the entire system. They
reject some clients, however, because what the clients demand, cannot
in good conscience be done-it is always a calculus of justice gained
versus justice lost, and the hard cases are a little bit of both."0
CONCLUSION
My model even works for the cases which Allegretti cites as being
beyond his covenant ideal-lawyers with mammoth corporations or
prosecutors and government lawyers where "there are no clients at all
in the conventional sense." They too can consistently make decisions
that counteract the notion that there may be no justice and no judge.
Contracts are sacred things, I assert, because they are the essence of
justice and of judging. They need not be minimal. When appropriate,
I freely commend their growth into covenants just as Allegretti urges.
When not, it is enough for me to go home each night having convinced
myself and others, just a bit, that we need not abandon the human
search for a judge and for justice.
19. Midrash Rabbah, Genesis 26:6. The lesson is popularly know from ilton
Steinberg's novel, As a Driven Leaf, where it is applied to the case of second-century
heretic, Elisha ben Abuyah, who is said to have lost his faith when he saw one man
obey the laws of Deuteronomy, and die as a result, and another defy the same law and
escape without injury. On Elisha, cf. Midrash Rabbah, Ruth 6:4; Midrash Rabbah,
Ecc 7:8.
20. A specific issue worth developing at another time is whether a lawyer may use
the legal system for a client's benefit, when the aspect of the system being used is the
application of a legal loophole which itself is not intended by the system, and there-
fore itself not just. I argue that all legal systems are impure mixtures of justice and
injustice, but generally, as long as the law is applied fairly to one and all, the Talmud
rules that we work within it because "[t]he law of the land is the law." Having decided
to work within it, we may indeed be justified in using even a loophole in it, if we
calculate that the injustice that will accrue to the benefit of our client is less than the
injustice that our failure to use it would add to the system as a whole.
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